A little while back i commented on Marcus Ranums HiTB talk "Cyberwar is Bullshit!". I ended the post with the words "Ranum is indeed much better than this..". Ranum spoke recently at Source Boston, and his talk [The Anatomy of Security Disasters] indeed shows this is true..
If you are in the industry to make a quick buck, or because it beats flipping burgers at McD's, you probably dont need to, but if you are involved with security decisions at any level, then you really should take a few minutes to digest his talk.
If i have any criticism of the piece, it is simply this: Ranum frames the issues in terms of computer security, but actually the behavior he describes is pretty symptomatic of dysfunctional management in general.
"there is a huge disconnect between what management hears and what they are told — a disconnect so severe that senior management .. can deride security practitioners as "whiners" while still expecting them to enable business securely"
His timeline of a disaster is spot on, and im sure is something that will cause vigorous head nodding from readers all over the planet:
"At the beginning of the disaster, a bad idea is proposed. Often, someone immediately tries to shoot it down, or point out its flaws. In very rare corporate cultures, the idea dies there and the whole disaster is averted. More typically, the bad idea survives - as does the trail of Emails pointing out the initial flaws.
..
Next comes the most interesting part of the disaster. Suppose management is duly and accurately apprised of the fact that the idea is bad. If the idea is something management really wants to do, there is sometimes a period of negotiation, or re-tuning. The idea bounces back and forth and has various tweaks applied to it, but two important things remain:
-
- It is still a bad idea.
- It is going to happen anyway.
Then comes the most crucial part of the disaster: the point at which management's expectations begin to form a reality gap. Generally, this happens because management believes it has set out some objectives, and does not realize that those objectives are being renegotiated because the basic objectives are literally impossible or simply ridiculous.
Up in the corner office, they see people working hard on making the idea come to fruition, plans are being made and considerations are being weighed. The trade-offs that are being made, which place the organization at risk, are being somewhat improved with compensating controls, but nobody has been able to break it to the corner suite that we're still dealing with a fundamentally bad idea. More importantly, still, the compensating controls may serve to obscure the fact that they amount to little more than butt-covering. In the most dysfunctional organizations, you get senior (or sometimes mid-level) executives who 'shop a bad idea' until they find someone who is willing to tell them it is good."
I originally planned to include only small sections of Ranums talk, but felt i couldnt leave those snippets out.. I have sat in on more than my fair share of executive meetings, and his words ring true wether it relates to security decisions or even just strategic ones.. I love the Feynman report he quotes, and firmly believe that one of the biggest challenges we face is trying to break the insane "reality gap" that seems to prevail in boardrooms across the globe.
/mh
"Simply put, such disasters are purely the fault of poor management; managers who 'shop' bad ideas, or who create organizational cultures in which staff that point out problems are "whiners" or "nay-sayers." Unfortunately, in most businesses, senior level managers are recruited for being "can do" types who get the job done, which means that you're particularly in danger of having to deal with a senior executive that is comfortably living with a serious reality gap"








list. I have a lot of time for what these guys have to say and I thought
some of their comments on Rannum's thoughts were worth reproducing.
Please forgive my wanton use of Copy and Paste...
<Andy Steingruebel>
Interestingly enough nowhere in this piece does Marcus indicate how we know the idea is "bad." He simply stipulates that someone has said so, or proven it somehow, based on something. It isn't clear to me how this happens, what evidence the person has for it, or why anyone should take them seriously.
...
My takeaway from this rant is what?
</Andy>
<Alex Hutton>
It's kind of the same thing he's been saying for quite some time now. No new information, no new approach on his part to the obvious counter-arguments. So there's not really much to say...
</Alex>
<Andy again>
1. Security is hard, hell, we don't really know what "secure" means
2. We don't really know how to do it even if we can define it
3. Organizations and their decision making are dysfunctional
I'll agree that hearing Marcus rant can be fun... just not sure its conference worthy material in this case.
...
I sure do wish more security folks would read about real engineering disasters. Not all of them are as plagued by bad decisions as the shuttle disaster was. Everyone wants to call that one out because it is easy as a postmortem to see how failed decision making resulted in an accident.
More illustrative I think are the case studies Petroski pulls together in his works. He talks about other real world engineering failures/disasters where we do have takeaway lessons, but they can't all just be attributed to someone not following Tufte's advice and using better presentations of data.
Sometimes there are things we simply don't know, couldn't have reasonably known, and bad things happen.
Engineering for all that it is a science still gets put into practice by people.
The next person who talks to me about the shuttle disasters loses credibility if they can't also talk about another failure. And no, the Tacoma Narrows bridge doesn't count either. Go look up some other failures before you want to talk about this subject and be credible.
</Andy>
There were some other worthy interesting posts in the thread (Cohen's piece on black swans - http://all.net/Analyst/2009-04.pdf - is worth the 5 minutes it takes to read) but you'll have to go dig through them all yourself...
I think a ranum post these days is as likely to get shouts as it is to get shouted down, and i think its ironic that ranum is now getting hit by contrarians when so much of his ranting is simply him being contrarian.. but.. i dont think ranum in general or "people who quote engineering disasters" in general should detract from the points i highlighted in the post.. i.e. that if someone cares or has a vested interest in the successful running of an organization, it is important that they spend some time add
ressing "reality gaps".