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Thu, 18 Aug 2011

SensePost Black Hat Course Summary & chosing the right courses

As we draw nearer to Black Hat Vegas we get a lot of requests from people who need help choosing between one of our courses or the other. In order to provide people with a single, consolidated summary of all the courses we'll be offering this year I've put together a rough summary doc that outlines all the courses and attempts to illustrate how they fit together. Get it here:

sensepost_training_overview_0711_admin

What perhaps doesn't come through well in that doc is how to go about planning your training schedule. As you know there are two training sessions - the 'weekend' (30 - 31 July) and the 'week' (01 - 02 August). Some providers offer 4 day training sessions, but we've offered to stick to 2-day 'modules' that can be mixed and matched as required.

The courses we're offering are:

A summary of all these courses can be found here.

Now, each of these courses can be taken individually, but if you look at the diagram below you'll see they're also designed to be slotted together as congruent 4-day sessions.

As I've mentioned, the courses can all be taken individually, but the popular combinations are:

  • Cadet -> Bootcamp (beginners)
  • Cadet -> Unplugged (Wifi, beginners)
  • Cadet -> W^3 (Web Hacking, beginners)
  • Bootcamp -> BlackOps (Intermediate)
  • Bootcamp -> W^3 (Web Hacking, intermediate)
  • BlackOps -> Combat (advanced)
Still can't make up your mind? Give us a shout and we'll be glad to help you out...

Fri, 15 Jul 2011

Security Policies - Go Away

Security policies are necessary, but their focus is to the detriment of more important security tasks. If auditors had looked for trivial SQL injection on a companies front-page as hard as they have checked for security polices, then maybe our industry would be in a better place. I want to make this go away, I want to help you tick the box so you can focus on the real work. If you just want the "tool" skip to the end.

A year and a half ago, SensePost started offering "build it" rather than "break it" consulting services, we wanted to focus on technical, high-quality advisory work. However, by far the most frequently "consulting" request we've seen has been asking for security policies. Either a company approaches us looking for them explicitly or they want them bolted on to other work. The gut feel I've picked up over the years is that if someone is asking you to develop security policies for them, then either they're starting on security at the behest of some external or compliance requirement or they're hoping that this is the first step in an information security program. (Obviously, I can't put everything into the same bucket, but I'm talking generally) Both are rational reasons to want to get your information security policies sorted, but getting outside consultants to spend even a week's worth of time developing them for you, is time that could be better spent in my opinion. My reasons for this are two-fold:

  • If you're starting a security program, then you have a lot to learn and possibly a lot of convincing of senior management to do. Something like an internal penetration test (not that I'm advocating this specifically instead of policy) will give you far more insight into the security of your environment and a lot more "red ink" that can be used to highlight the risk to the "higher ups".
  • Security policies don't "do" anything. They are a representation of management's intention and agreements around security controls, which in the best case, provide a "cover my ass" defense if an employee takes you to task for intercepting their e-mails or something similar. The policies need to be used to derive actual controls, and are not controls in themselves.
Instead, we too often end up in a world where security policies, rather than good security, is the end goal while new technologies keep us amused developing new ones (mobile policies, social media policies, data leakage policies etc.)

Saying all of this is fine, but it doesn't make the auditors stop asking, and it doesn't put a green box or tick in the ISO/PCI/CoBIT/HIPAA/SOX policies checkbox. Previously, I've pointed people at existing policy repositories, where sample policies can be downloaded and modified to suit their need. Sites such as CSOOnline or PacketSource have links to some policies, but by far the most comprehensive source of free security policy templates is SANS. The problem is people seem to look at these, think it looks like work, and move on to a consultancy that's happy to charge for a month's worth of time. Even when you don't, the policies are buried in sub-pages that don't always make sense (for example, why is the Acceptable Use Policy put under "computer security"), even then several of them are only available in PDF form (hence not editable), even though they are explicitly written as modifiable templates. What I did was to go through all of these pages, download the documents, convert them into relevant formats and categorise them into a single view in a spreadsheet with hyperlinks to the documents. I've also included their guidance documents on how to write good sec policies, and ISO 27001-linked policy roadmaps. I haven't modified any of the actual content of the documents, and those retain their original copyright. I'm not trying to claim any credit for others' hard work, merely make the stuff a little more accessible.

You can download the index and documents HERE.

In future, I hope to add more "good" policies (a few of the SANS policies aren't wonderful), and also look into expanding into security standards (ala CIS Security) in the future. If necessary, take this to a consultancy, and ask them to spend some time making these specific to your organisation and way of doing things, but please, if you aren't getting the basics right, don't focus on these. In the meantime, if you're looking for information security policies to go away, so you can get on with the bigger problems organisations, and our industry in general are facing, then this should be a useful tool.

Thu, 7 Jul 2011

House of Cards

In light of recent mass hacks (HBGary, Sony, Nintendo, etc) one would have thought that collectively, companies would take notice and at least be slightly more aware of the potential implications vulnerabilities in public-facing services could have.

The problem appears to be that these hacks, and indeed hackers, aren't that technically superior and more often than not, take advantage of simple flaws. Some flaws, like SQL injection, provide so much access on their own that a fairly grim attack scenario can be painted. However, often attackers don't require such extravagant flaws to gain access. Chained attacks utilising "low risk" attacks can be far more deadly than a single flaw.

We had an interesting scenario recently which demonstrated this. This is one example of how we use these minor flaws to gain access, and also show how the house of cards can fall quite spectacularly when basic security principles are not adhered to. We were on a fairly bread and butter security assessment; perform an analysis of the target (a large multinational) and determine where their weaknesses were from an unauthenticated perspective. Increasingly, we advise against unauthenticated assessments as we feel we can offer more value when you assume the shell is already cracked, but this was a special case.

The web application was good; it soon became clear that the developers had followed guidelines for the development of secure applications and ensured that common attacks were indeed handled in a suitable manner. What they didn't do, however, was apply a stringent hardening process to the server itself, and as the platitude goes "security is only as good as the weakest link."

  1. First blood was nothing more than a simple directory indexing misconfiguration that allowed our analysts to browse the directories unauthenticated. Within these, files containing sensitive information such as usernames and passwords and internal IP addressing schemes were uncovered.
  2. Next, a popular administrative package was found with the administrator username pre-populated and after a very brief brute-force attempt, a weak password was discovered. This gave the analyst complete administrative access to one of the minor portals.
  3. Inside was a well-organised list of servers, user names, passwords and comments about each service and server. With minimal effort, a menu of pwnage-possibilities were presented. The assessment was immediately stopped and a conference call arranged with the security team at the client to inform them of the situation. A detailed email (crypted) was sent to the team that showed the path of attack and end result.
What happened next was nothing short of unbelievable.

The analyst had already obtained all administrative user names and passwords (stored in a database with no protection at all) and had logged into a number to confirm access. My email, now forwarded in the clear, was sent to all involved with a stern "fix it". Since we had access to the mailboxes, we saw an admin send the reply: "..have changed the password. Ask them to check if the password is strong now, there's no way they can get in now."

Yes, the password was indeed strong and certainly constructed in a recommended manner, but the administrator's account was already compromised and we were monitoring communications. This wasn't an appropriate response, it's a bit like using AV to clean a virus from a box, post-infection, instead of rebuilding it. Some data mining through multiple unencrypted mailboxes provided numerous credentials for other servers inside the network. We could pivot through the internal network to our hearts content, while monitoring their comms to make sure our supply line wasn't under threat.

Takeaway I: Once an attacker is inside the perimeter, trying to control intruder access at the perimeter is a game you've already lost. i.e. Blocking the path in, doesn't mean you've blocked the paths in use.

Starting with a simple directory listing flaw, one that Nessus rates as a "low" risk, the house of cards fell at an alarming rate. Security isn't about looking only at the high risks, because attackers won't limit themselves the same way.