Aah, January, a month where resolutions usually flare out spectacularly before we get back to the couch in February. We'd like to help you along your way with a reverse engineering challenge put together by Siavosh as an introduction to reversing, and a bit of fun.
Once you reached the final levels, you might need to spend some time understanding x86 assembly or spend some time refreshing it depending on your level. To help out, Siavosh created a crash course tutorial in x86 assembly for our malware workshop at 44con last year, and you can download that over here.
The zip file containing the reversing challenge and additional bytecode binaries could be found here.
Send your solution(s) to challenge at sensepost.com
Disclaimer: When using the term "virtual machine" we mean something like the Java Virtual Machine. A software based architecture that you can write programs for. This particular architecture, EvilGroupVM.exe, has nine instructions whose operation code (opcode) you need to find through binary reverse engineering.
The tools you will require are:
Windows: EvilGroupVM.exe <BytecodeFile>
Ubuntu Linux: ./EvilGroupVM <BytecodeFile>
The outcome of this exercise should include the following key structures in your report:
In case you missed it earlier, the zip file containing the reversing challenge and additional bytecode binaries could be found here.
Send your solution(s) to challenge at sensepost.com
We recently gave a talk at the ITWeb Security Summit entitled "Offense Oriented Defence". The talk was targeted at defenders and auditors, rather then hackers (the con is oriented that way), although it's odd that I feel the need to apologise for that ;)
The talks primary point, was that by understanding how attackers attack, more innovative defences can be imagined. The corollary was that common defences, in the form of "best practise" introduce commonality that is more easily exploited, or at least degrade over time as attackers adapt. Finally, many of these "security basics" are honestly hard, and we can't place the reliance on them we'd hoped. But our approach doesn't seem to want to acknowledge the problem, and much like an AA meeting, it's time we recognise the problem.
If you had to look at the average security strategy or budget items, you often end up with a list containing a couple of these:
But, the truth is many of these items don't actually block attacks, or the few that do, don't really counter the common bypassed used to side-step them. For example:
The current place we seem to be in is akin to having everyone build a wall. Attackers get to evaluate the wall, figure out how to get over it, and add to their capability (i.e. get a longer rope). But once they have a longer rope, they can use it over and over again, and against more than one wall. So attackers, who are quite good at sharing, get to keep building their tool chain, while all defenders can do it to keep building a higher wall, and maintaining the increasingly untenable structure. By understanding how attackers attack, we can break out of this and try more innovative approaches.
The talk is illustrated with four broad examples: Passwords, Patches, Anti-Virus and DMZs. For each, the belief around specific configurations is discussed, and how those don't stand up to how attackers actually attack. For example, the way AV's believed to work doesn't seem to correspond with how easy they are to bypass, or the common configuration of standard password controls such as lockout, don't seem to take into account horizontal brute-force attacks.
The point I want to make here is somewhat subtle; if you walk away thinking I've described new attacks, then you've missed it, if you think I'm recommending "the basics" then you've missed it. Truthfully, maybe it's just that I didn't make it very well ... decide for yourself, here are the slides:
One of the things we try and get across in our training - is that pen-testing requires out of the box thinking. It's also about solving puzzles and making things work the way you want them to. It's about identifying the small vulnerabilities (which are often easy to spot), and trying to leverage them into something useful. A key process we strive to do at SensePost, when performing these penetration tests, is about having fun.
However, since we're not presenting our HBN Combat course at BlackHat this year, we thought we'd treat people to a nice, mind-boggling challenge prior to BlackHat. Furthermore, instead of opting for the normal crypto or reversing-type challenges which seem to have become the norm, we thought we'd make it an infrastructure challenge for once. In other words, people get to compromise real, live boxen. We've also made it real-world, this is something you might be faced with when performing a infrastructure test.
You've been tasked with performing an infrastructure assessment against ACME Bank. You've fired up your favorite foot printing tool, run through the usual intelligence gathering methodology and noticed they seem to have a minute Internet footprint. So small, in fact, that the only entry point you have is what appears to be a router at 22.214.171.124.
Obtain access to a host on the internal network and put your name on the wall of fame. The first name on the wall wins.
If one takes a quick glimpse at the target, it will be obvious that the person who makes the first break is probably going to be able to control what other people do (with great power comes great responsibility). Also, there is probably a relatively high chance of people inadvertently blocking themselves off from the target. As such, the challenge is going to be reset to "factory default" at 04h00 MT every day.
We've created a very cool SensePost Blackhat USA 2013 t-shirt and this is limited edition to SensePost staff only, but for the person who gets the first name on the wall, we think you deserve your own.
Have fun, happy haxoring, and hope to see you all at BlackHat.
There are multiple paths one could take to getting Domain Admin on a Microsoft Windows Active Directory Domain. One common method for achieving this is to start by finding a system where a privileged domain account, such as a domain admin, is logged into or has recently been logged into. Once access to this system has been gained, either stealing their security tokens (ala Incognito or pass-the-hash attacks) or querying Digest Authentication (with Mimikatz/WCE) to get their clear-text password. The problem is finding out where these user's are logged in.
I've often seen nmap and the smb-enum-sessions script (http://nmap.org/nsedoc/scripts/smb-enum-sessions.html) used to retrieve all the user sessions on the network. This (not so grep'pable) output is then grep'ed to find the hosts where our target user is logged in. The process of smb-enum-sessions and subsequent analysis can be quite time consuming and clumsy. On a recent assessment, multiple tunnels in, where uploading nmap wasn't a great idea, we realised that there has to be a better way of doing this. While searching for an alternative solution we came across PsLoggedOn (SysInternals Suite) which, with a single binary, allows you search the network for locations where a user is logged in. The downside with this is that it doesn't cleanly run via psexec or other remote shells and you need graphical logon to a system on the domain, and you need to upload another binary (the PsLoggedOn executable) to the target system. Examining how PsLoggedOn worked we figured out that it was simply using the Windows NetSessionEnum API. Having a look at the API I figured that it should be possible to write a simple post exploit module for Metasploit using the railgun.
After some trial and error, we now present enum_domain_user.rb a simple Metasploit post exploit module capable of finding network sessions for a specific user. Below is a screenshot of the module in action.
To use the module,
1.) Download and copy it to:
(we'll send a pull request to metasploit-framework's github shortly).
2.) In MSF:
3.) Set the USER and SESSION variables.
4.) Then simply run it with "
The module can also be used directly from meterpreter with:
run post/windows/gather/enum_domain_user USER=username
Warning, this doesn't seem to work with x64 meterpreter yet mostly likely due to some memory pointer stuff I haven't worked out. Hopefully this will get updated shortly, or even better, one of you smart people out there can fix my horrible Ruby.
history" will give display the last 10 commands executed. If you wish to see more commands, type
history <numberof entries>
To run a command from the history list type:
history !<command number>
Below is an action shot of the history module.
1.) Download and Copy history.rb to the plugins folder:
2.) In msfconsole type:
3.) For usage info type:
Both modules are available for download on Github, and I'll submit a pull request to metasploit-framework shortly. Please feel free to fork and be merry. Any updates/fixes/comments are welcome.
A cloud storage service such as Microsoft SkyDrive requires building data centers as well as operational and maintenance costs. An alternative approach is based on distributed computing model which utilizes portion of the storage and processing resources of consumer level computers and SME NAS devices to form a peer to peer storage system. The members contribute some of their local storage space to the system and in return receive "online backup and data sharing" service. Providing data confidentiality, integrity and availability in such de-centerlized storage system is a big challenge to be addressed. As the cost of data storage devices declines, there is a debate that whether the P2P storage could really be cost saving or not. I leave this debate to the critics and instead I will look into a peer to peer storage system and study its security measures and possible issues. An overview of this system's architecture is shown in the following picture:
Each node in the storage cloud receives an amount of free online storage space which can be increased by the control server if the node agrees to "contribute" some of its local hard drive space to the system. File synchronisation and contribution agents that are running on every node interact with the cloud control server and other nodes as shown in the above picture. Folder/File synchronisation is performed in the following steps:
1) The node authenticates itself to the control server and sends file upload request with file meta data including SHA1 hash value, size, number of fragments and file name over HTTPS connection.
2) The control server replies with the AES encryption key for the relevant file/folder, a [IP Address]:[Port number] list of contributing nodes called "endpoints list" and a file ID.
3) The file is split into blocks each of which is encrypted with the above AES encryption key. The blocks are further split into 64 fragments and redundancy information also gets added to them.
4) The node then connects to the contribution agent on each endpoint address that was received in step 2 and uploads one fragment to each of them
Since the system nodes are not under full control of the control server, they fall offline any time or the stored file fragments may become damaged/modified intentionally. As such, the control server needs to monitor node and fragment health regularly so that it may move lost/damaged fragments to alternate nodes if need be. For this purpose, the contribution agent on each node maintains an HTTPS connection to the control server on which it receives the following "tasks":
a) Adjust settings : instructs the node to modify its upload/download limits , contribution size and etc
b) Block check : asks the node to connect to another contribution node and verify a fragment existence and hash value
c) Block Recovery : Assist the control server to recover a number of fragments
By delegating the above task, the control system has placed some degree of "trust" or at least "assumptions" about the availability and integrity of the agent software running on the storage cloud nodes. However, those agents can be manipulated by malicious nodes in order to disrupt cloud operations, attack other nodes or even gain unauthorised access to the distributed data. I limited the scope of my research to the synchronisation and contribution agent software of two storage nodes under my control - one of which was acting as a contribution node. I didn't include the analysis of the encryption or redundancy of the system in my preliminary research because it could affect the live system and should only be performed on a test environment which was not possible to set up, as the target system's control server was not publicly available. Within the contribution agent alone, I identified that not only did I have unauthorised access file storage (and download) on the cloud's nodes, but I had unauthorised access to the folder encryption keys as well.
a) Unauthorised file storage and download
The contribution agent created a TCP network listener that processed commands from the control server as well as requests from other nodes. The agent communicated over HTTP(s) with the control server and other nodes in the cloud. An example file fragment upload request from a remote node is shown below:
Uploading fragments with similar format to the above path name resulted in the "bad request" error from the agent. This indicated that the fragment name should be related to its content and this condition is checked by the contribution agent before accepting the PUT request. By decompiling the agent software code, it was found that the fragment name must have the following format to pass this validation:
<SHA1(uploaded content)>.<Fragment number>.<Global Folder Id>
I used the above file fragment format to upload notepad.exe to the remote node successfully as you can see in the following figure:
The download request (GET request) was also successful regardless of the validity of "Global Folder Id" and "Fragment Number". The uploaded file was accessible for about 24 hours, until it was purged automatically by the contribution agent, probably because it won't receive any "Block Check" requests for the control server for this fragment. Twenty four hours still is enough time for malicious users to abuse storage cloud nodes bandwidth and storage to serve their contents over the internet without victim's knowledge.
b) Unauthorised access to folder encryption keys
The network listener responded to GET requests from any remote node as mentioned above. This was intended to serve "Block Check" commands from the control server which instructs a node to fetch a number of fragments from other nodes (referred to as "endpoints") and verify their integrity but re-calculating the SHA1 hash and reporting back to the control server. This could be part of the cloud "health check" process to ensure that the distributed file fragments are accessible and not tampered with. The agent could also process "File Recovery" tasks from the control server but I didn't observe any such command from the control server during the dynamic analysis of the contribution agent, so I searched the decompiled code for clues on the file recovery process and found the following code snippet which could suggest that the agent is cable of retrieving encryption keys from the control server. This was something odd, considering that each node should only have access to its own folders encryption keys and it stores encrypted file fragments of other nodes.
While peer to peer storage systems have lower setup/maintenance costs, they face security threats from the storage nodes that are not under direct physical/remote control of the cloud controller system. Examples of such threats relate to the cloud's client agent software and the cloud server's authorisation control, as demonstrated in this post. While analysis of the data encryption and redundancy in the peer to peer storage system would be an interesting future research topic, we hope that the findings from this research can be used to improve the security of various distributed storage systems.