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11 results were found... happy reading.

Tue, 10 Aug 2010

Information Security South Africa (ISSA) 2010
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Last week we presented an invited talk at the ISSA conference on the topic of online privacy (embedded below, click through to SlideShare for the original PDF.)

The talk is an introductory overview of Privacy from a Security perspective and was prompted by discussions between security & privacy people along the line of "Isn't Privacy just directed Security? Privacy is to private info what PCI is to card info?" It was further prompted by discussion with Joe the Plumber along the lines of "Privacy is dead!"

The talk, is unfortunately best delivered as a talk, and not as standalone slides, so here's some commentary:

We start off the problem statement describing why privacy has grown in importance. The initial reactions were based on new technology allowing new types of information to be captured and disseminated. While the example given is from the 1980s, the reaction is a recurring one, as we've seen with each release of new tech (some examples: Cameras, Newspapers, Credit Cards, The Internet, Facebook). Reactions are worsened by the existence of actors with the funding & gall to collect and collate much information to further potentially disagreeable goals (usually Governments). However, the new threat is that there has been a fundamental shift in the way in which we live our lives, where information about us is no longer merely *recorded* online, but rather, our lives are *lived* on line. It is quite possible that for an average day, from waking up to going to sleep, a significant number of the actions you perform will not only be conducted (in part) online, but that it is possible for them to be conducted using the services of one service provider. My intention is not to beat up on Google, but rather use them as an example. They are a pertinent example, as every business book seems to use them as one. The, arguably, most successful corporation of our current age's primary business model is the collection & monetisation of private data. Thus, while Google is the example, there are and will be many followers.

The next section moves into providing a definition of privacy, and attempts to fly through some fairly dry aspects of philosophy, law & psychology. We've done some entry-level work on collating the conception of privacy across history and these fields, however, brighter minds, such as Daniel Solove and Kamil Reddy have done better jobs of this. In particular, Solove's paper "I've got nothing to hide", and other misconception of privacy is a good introductory read. The key derived point however, is that private data is data with an implied access control & authorised use. Which of the implied access controls & authorised uses are reasonable to enforce or can be legally enforced is a developing field.

As the talk is about "Online Privacy" the talk moves into a description of the various levels at which private data is collected, what mechanisms are used to attempt to collect that data, and what sort of data can be gleaned. It was an academic conference, so I threw in the word "taxonomy." Soon, it will be more frequently quoted than Maslow's Hierarchy, any day now.

At each level, a brief demonstration of non-obvious leaks and their implications was demonstrated. From simple techniques such as cross-site tracking using tracking pixels or cookies, to exploit of rich browser environments such as the simple CSS history hack, to less structured and less obvious leaks such as search data (as demonstrated by the AOL leak), moving to deanonymisation of an individual by correlating public data sets (using the awesome Maltego) and finally to unintended leaks provided by meta-data (through analysis of twitter & facebook friends groups).

Finally, a mere two slides are used to explain some of the implications and defenses. These are incomplete and are the current area of research I'm engaged in.

Tue, 13 Jul 2010

GlypeAhead: Portscanning through PHP Glype proxies
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As the need for online anonymity / privacy grew, the proxy industry flourished with many proxy owners generating passive incomes from their proxy networks.

Although 'proxy' is normally thought to imply some sort of daemonized application, such as Squid (or a SOCKS) daemon, the last couple of years have heralded in the age of CGI proxies and more commonly, their PHP variants.

These PHP proxies are extremely trivial to deploy and configure, especially since most hosting environments have PHP installed by default. When development of PHProxy (a popular PHP proxy) ceased, many devoted fans starting releasing their own customised PHProxy fixes and variants. In recent years, however, many proxy owners have gravitated towards Glype since it seemed to be well maintained (though the current status may be questionable).

While there have been tools created to portscan targets through SOCKS and HTTP proxies, I am not aware of any which reliably performed it through the current range of PHP proxies.

By default, Glype has few restrictions on what hosts / ports can be accessed through it and normally displays its cURL error messages as well. Using these apparent weaknesses, GlypeAhead is able to perform portscans of targets with reasonable accuracy.

It must be mentioned that even if a port is open on the target, it will be regarded as closed if the Glype proxy in use is unable to successfully connect to the service.

Due to GlypeAhead being a proof-of-concept tool, its logic has been purposefully limited to only work against Glype installations which display the default cURL error messages.

Below are screenshots of a Nmap scan compared to a GlypeAhead scan.

Nmap scan of a Target (ports 22, 25 and 80)

GlypeAhead scan of a Target (ports 22, 25 and 80)

GlypeAhead is written in PHP (as is the Glype proxy), requires the cURL extension to be compiled with PHP, and is available from either our Pentesting Tools section, or directly from here.

Sun, 23 Aug 2009

John Viega's "the myths of security".. Really??
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i go through a ton of books. Over the past 10 years, this has been dominated by books on computer security, computer science, programming (and some sprinklings of management classics).

I generally stay away from writing reviews, but was genuinely suprised at the number of 5 star reviews Viega's new book had received and felt i had to chime in.

I picked up "the myths of security" (what the computer industry doesn't want you to know) with hope, because O'Reilly books in general are well done and i really liked some of Johns previous books. Alas! I tried hard to think of a good thing to say about the book, and the best i can come up with right now is that "at least, it wont take up space on my bookshelf".

The book is tiny (48 chapters, where each chapter is between a paragraph to 2-3 pages) which isn't a bad thing, but it reads mostly as a collection of blog posts or hurriedly written notes-to-self.

Advertising++ The Foreword alone uses the word McAfee 14 times, and over the 48 chapters, the word McAfee goes on to appear about 65 times. This is acceptable on a blog, in a book i just paid for its slightly annoying.

Target Audience I agree with Bejtlich who cant figure the books target audience. One chapter might give explanations in crayon (presumably for the less sophisticated user) while the next chapter might give advice for how to label the security technology you plan to sell.

Consistency There are a number of times in the book where the author takes opposite sides of an argument (in different chapters). This is useful if coherently positioned as 2 sides of an argument, but if this is used on different arguments on different pages, it seems more like the author is merely choosing the position thats convenient to support his view at the time...

It's slightly odd when compared with his take on security spend to hear the author say this about the TSA and their "Security Theater": "But there's some hidden value here—it makes people feel safer. Whether it works well or poorly, it is better than nothing and it makes people feel better."

General whining (by me). The author dedicates a chapter to Mobile Phones titled "OK, Your Mobile Phone Is Insecure; Should You Care?". He concludes with: "Sure, there will always be the occasional virus for smartphones, but I don't see an epidemic emerging. At the end of the day, there is still lower-hanging fruit for the bad guys. It is still far easier for them to make money attacking traditional PCs and laptops then going after mobile phones. That may eventually change, but I'm not going to hold my breath."

I think the view that you only need to be worried about the ability of your device to withstand an attack "epidemic" is wrong on so many levels. Im far less worried about my iPhone becoming part of a botnet than i am of the fact that these days huge parts of my life are on it, and can be grabbed by Charlie Miller if he is willing to pay the $0.20 to send me a few SMS'es.

In his Epilogue, he writes: "But instead of preaching that the customer is hosed, I'm preaching that the security industry is hosed—I don't think customers are hosed at all." which is an interesting contrast to his chapter on PKI that ends with "That leaves the Internet fundamentally broken."..

Of course the lines that most bothered me were in the chapters on Privacy and Anonymity. Privacy gets just under 200 words but includes the classic line: "privacy is nice in theory, but if you don't have anything to hide, what's the big deal?"

Hmm.. OK.. lets see the take on anonymity before responding.

Anonymity gets 166 words (wow - 100 words more than the word McAfee!) and once more ends with the classic: "Oh, and I've got nothing to hide anyway…."

The author cites the example of Zero-Knowledge, who built a paid service to surf anonymously which "worked pretty well, but nobody cared".

Once more, i think there is so much wrong here, that im not sure where to start. Having to convince someone that Privacy is important even if you cant sell it seems like a pretty old argument to be having..

In general, i think its safe to say that the book left me disappointed, and a little bit afraid that somewhere decision makers could be forming an opinion on an entire industry based on ~250 words dedicated to a topic that deserves much more thought..

/mh

Mon, 30 Mar 2009

Like deja-vu (all over again)
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Those of you who were around in 2001 will recall http://anti.security.is (anti-sec f.a.q)..

The sentiment pops up periodically (in different forms) and it seems like CansecWest this year has seen a resurgence of it.. From Charlie Millers comments on the Safari bug:

"Did you consider reporting the vulnerability to Apple?

I never give up free bugs. I have a new campaign. It's called NO MORE FREE BUGS. Vulnerabilities have a market value so it makes no sense to work hard to find a bug, write an exploit and then give it away. Apple pays people to do the same job so we know there's value to this work. No more free bugs."

to the art captured by Garett Gee:

(Alex Sotirov && Dino Dai Zovi)

As usual this sparks loud debate on both sides. Ross Thomas from SophosLabs came out loudly against Miller for being "so breathtakingly cavalier about the safety of my data and the privacy of my personal information" (sic)

Personally i must confess that i find Rosses reasoning pretty dodgy, but i recall having a similar discussion at 04h00 in the morning with singe in a Las Vegas food court..

Interesting times..

/mh

PS. oh.. almost forgot, it doesnt matter which side of the argument-line you fall on, you have to give props to Internet Security's latest rockstar - the hax0r known as Nils for his elite browser trifacta [Safari|IE8|Firefox]

PPS. Oh.. can we please stop people talking about how the machines were hacked in X seconds. It makes a good headline, but its annoying..

Thu, 21 Feb 2008

Prof Felten (and friends) attack bitlocker/filevault (and friends)
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So felten et al basically figured that cooling dram chips  allows an attacker to move them to another machine where they can be leeched!

freeze.PNG

The geek in me cant help but say "COOL!" According to the comments posted (by Eugene Spafford no less) this sort of attack is fairly well known.. but.. for this humble fanboy, i think its still pretty rocking!

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