nmap -sV -Pn --versiondb=nmap-service-probes.pi --script=poison-ivy.nse <ip_address/range)
nmap -sV -Pn --versiondb=nmap-service-probes.pi <ip_range>
If you have any questions, please contact email@example.com
Recently a security researcher reported a bug in Facebook that could potentially allow Remote Code Execution (RCE). His writeup of the incident is available here if you are interested. The thing that caught my attention about his writeup was not the fact that he had pwned Facebook or earned $33,500 doing it, but the fact that he used OpenID to accomplish this. After having a quick look at the output from the PoC and rereading the vulnerability description I had a pretty good idea of how the vulnerability was triggered and decided to see if any other platforms were vulnerable.
The basic premise behind the vulnerability is that when a user authenticates with a site using OpenID, that site does a 'discovery' of the user's identity. To accomplish this the server contacts the identity server specified by the user, downloads information regarding the identity endpoint and proceeds with authentication. There are two ways that a site may do this discovery process, either through HTML or a YADIS discovery. Now this is where it gets interesting, HTML look-up is simply a HTML document with some meta information contained in the head tags:
Whereas the Yadis discovery relies on a XRDS document:
Now if you have been paying attention the potential for exploitation should be jumping out at you. XRDS is simply XML and as you may know, when XML is used there is a good chance that an application may be vulnerable to exploitation via XML External Entity (XXE) processing. XXE is explained by OWASP and I'm not going to delve into it here, but the basic premise behind it is that you can specify entities in the XML DTD that when processed by an XML parser get interpreted and 'executed'.
From the description given by Reginaldo the vulnerability would be triggered by having the victim (Facebook) perform the YADIS discovery to a host we control. Our host would serve a tainted XRDS and our XXE would be triggered when the document was parsed by our victim. I whipped together a little PoC XRDS document that would cause the target host to request a second file (198.x.x.143:7806/success.txt) from a server under my control. I ensured that the tainted XRDS was well formed XML and would not cause the parser to fail (a quick check can be done by using http://www.xmlvalidation.com/index.php)
In our example the fist <Service> element would parse correctly as a valid OpenID discovery, while the second <Service> element contains our XXE in the form of <URI>&a;</URI>. To test this we set spun up a standard LAMP instance on DigitalOcean and followed the official installation instructions for a popular, OpenSource, Social platform that allowed for OpenID authentication. And then we tried out our PoC.
It worked! The initial YADIS discovery (orange) was done by our victim (107.x.x.117) and we served up our tainted XRDS document. This resulted in our victim requesting the success.txt file (red). So now we know we have some XXE going on. Next we needed to turn this into something a little more useful and emulate Reginaldo's Facebook success. A small modification was made to our XXE payload by changing the Entity description for our 'a' entity as follows: <!ENTITY a SYSTEM 'php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=/etc/passwd'>. This will cause the PHP filter function to be applied to our input stream (the file read) before the text was rendered. This served two purposes, firstly to ensure the file we were reading to introduce any XML parsing errors and secondly to make the output a little more user friendly.
The first run with this modified payload didn't yield the expected results and simply resulted in the OpenID discovery being completed and my browser trying to download the identity file. A quick look at the URL, I realised that OpenID expected the identity server to automatically instruct the user's browser to return to the site which initiated the OpenID discovery. As I'd just created a simple python web server with no intelligence, this wasn't happening. Fortunately this behaviour could be emulated by hitting 'back' in the browser and then initiating the OpenID discovery again. Instead of attempting a new discovery, the victim host would use the cached identity response (with our tainted XRDS) and the result was returned in the URL.
Finally all we needed to do was base64 decode the result from the URL and we would have the contents of /etc/passwd.
This left us with the ability to read *any* file on the filesystem, granted we knew the path and that the web server user had permissions to access that file. In the case of this particular platform, an interesting file to read would be config.php which yields the admin username+password as well as the mysql database credentials. The final trick was to try and turn this into RCE as was hinted in the Facebook disclosure. As the platform was written in PHP we could use the expect:// handler to execute code. <!ENTITY a SYSTEM 'expect://id'>, which should execute the system command 'id'. One dependency here is that the expect module is installed and loaded (http://de2.php.net/manual/en/expect.installation.php). Not too sure how often this is the case but other attempts at RCE haven't been too successful. Armed with our new XRDS document we reenact our steps from above and we end up with some code execution.
And Boom goes the dynamite.
All in all a really fun vulnerability to play with and a good reminder that data validation errors don't just occur in the obvious places. All data should be treated as untrusted and tainted, no matter where it originates from. To protect against this form of attack in PHP the following should be set when using the default XML parser:
A good document with PHP security tips can be found here: http://phpsecurity.readthedocs.org/en/latest/Injection-Attacks.html
Aah, January, a month where resolutions usually flare out spectacularly before we get back to the couch in February. We'd like to help you along your way with a reverse engineering challenge put together by Siavosh as an introduction to reversing, and a bit of fun.
Once you reached the final levels, you might need to spend some time understanding x86 assembly or spend some time refreshing it depending on your level. To help out, Siavosh created a crash course tutorial in x86 assembly for our malware workshop at 44con last year, and you can download that over here.
The zip file containing the reversing challenge and additional bytecode binaries could be found here.
Send your solution(s) to challenge at sensepost.com
Disclaimer: When using the term "virtual machine" we mean something like the Java Virtual Machine. A software based architecture that you can write programs for. This particular architecture, EvilGroupVM.exe, has nine instructions whose operation code (opcode) you need to find through binary reverse engineering.
The tools you will require are:
Windows: EvilGroupVM.exe <BytecodeFile>
Ubuntu Linux: ./EvilGroupVM <BytecodeFile>
The outcome of this exercise should include the following key structures in your report:
In case you missed it earlier, the zip file containing the reversing challenge and additional bytecode binaries could be found here.
Send your solution(s) to challenge at sensepost.com
Botconf'13, the "First botnet fighting conference" took place in Nantes, France from 5-6 December 2013. Botconf aimed to bring together the anti-botnet community, including law enforcement, ISPs and researchers. To this end the conference was a huge success, especially since a lot of networking occurred over the lunch and tea breaks as well as the numerous social events organised by Botconf.
I was fortunate enough to attend as a speaker and to present a small part of my Masters research. The talk focused the use of Spatial Statistics to detect Fast-Flux botnet Command and Control (C2) domains based on the geographic location of the C2 servers. This research aimed to find novel techniques that would allow for accurate and lightweight classifiers to detect Fast-Flux domains. Using DNS query responses it was possible to identify Fast-Flux domains based on values such as the TTL, number of A records and different ASNs. In an attempt to increase the accuracy of this classifier, additional analysis was performed and it was observed that Fast-Flux domains tended to have numerous C2 servers widely dispersed geographically. Through the use of the statistical methods employed in plant and animal dispersion statistics, namely Moran's I and Geary's C, new classifiers were created. It was shown that these classifiers could detect Fast-Flux domains with up to a 97% accuracy, maintaining a False Positive rate of only 3.25% and a True Positive rate of 99%. Furthermore, it was shown that the use of these classifiers would not significantly impact current network performance and would not require changes to current network architecture.
The scripts used to conduct the research are available on github and are in the process of being updated (being made human readable): https://github.com/staaldraad/fastfluxanalysis
The following blogs provide a comprehensive round-up of the conference including summaries of the talks:
With 2013 coming to a close, I thought it pertinent to look back at the year we've had and also forward to what's promising to be an incredibly exciting 2014 for us.
2013 for SensePost, was a year of transition. With a new leadership structure in myself, Shane and Dominic, we had a chance to stamp our style and vision and also learn from Charl and Jaco. One of the first leadership choices was to expand our reach and open our first office in London, aptly in a borough called Hackney. Here, we grew our family and welcomed some amazing people into the plak. After a few short months, we had outgrown the office and needed to look for bigger premises, this time in another aptly named area: Whitechapel (think Jack the Ripper).
Back in South Africa, after moving to bigger premises down the road, we finally got a chance to make it feel like home. These two new offices have allowed us to continue to grow at a steady pace, whilst still keeping the SensePost vision and vibe alive.
On a technical level, as this is what we are really about, we've had an amazing year. As part of this new vision, we made some key appointments:
Craig Swan, who originally was part of the assessments team and left, returned home to assume the role of Training Manager. On a training front, we've had one of the busiest years to date. From Blackhat in Las Vegas, Brasil and Seattle, to 44Con in London, for our friends in the US and our courses held in Southern Africa, we've trained hundreds of students in the art of offensive security. We've also created two new courses for the Hacking by Numbers series, one concentrating on mobile assessments and the other on malware reverse engineering. However, we are not resting on our laurels and with Craig on-board, 2014 is looking like being an amazing year for education at SensePost.
Victor Tadden, an experienced technical Project Manager, joined the assessment team to help us be more efficient with our delivery of projects. He brings with him a wealth of software dev experience and has already made a significant impact in the way we work, especially managing to wrangle pen testers together daily for scrum meetings, a feat many will tell you is akin to herding cats.
Tiago Rosado joined us from Portugal to head up our Managed Vulnerability Service, a key service line that many of our clients rely on for a more holistic view of their security posture. Our MVS service line is being revamped for 2014 and Tiago will help us achieve this.
Marc Peiser became our IT Manager and with him, brought a wealth of UNIX experience, having worked for a massive global bank. Marc's aim for 2014 is to ensure that our internal networks are not only robust but also allow us to do what we do. Surprisingly enough, we are frequently attacked and having defense in depth approach to IT is as important to us as it is to our clients.
Internally, we've welcomed some new family members, said goodbye to some.We value those who choose to work here very highly, we want work to be a creative environment where people can have fun, grow and most importantly enjoy coming to work. Nothing makes me more proud than seeing a plakker accepting new challenges, often defining the way the security industry works, or helping others with their security needs. As the penetration industry matures, one of my main goals for 2014 is to ensure that our proven hacker ethos remains.
2013 saw us presenting at conferences throughout the year and for the first time in our history, in a total of eight different countries over five continents. Our research included vulnerabilities in the Internet of things, distributed surveillance frameworks, security analysis of the Trustzone OS and Mobicore and finally using Spatial Statistics to detect Fast-Flux botnet Command and Control (C2) domains.
Technical prowess is still at the very heart of what we do at SensePost. We love to pwn and 2014 will see us continuing to write new tools, approach old problems with a new way of thinking and just being, well, us.
In November, after months of negotiations, came the news that we were to be acquired by SecureData Europe. This new chapter for us will usher in a new era of growth and development for us at SensePost and we are truly excited to be part of the SecureData Europe family.
Overall it was a fantastic year, especially for us, the new EXCO. I am extremely proud to stand alongside some incredibly talented people and call them colleagues and look forward to 2014 and what it brings.
From everyone at SensePost, we wish you a Merry Christmas and best wishes for the New Year.